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A Queer Critique on the Polygamy Debate in Canada:
Law, Culture, and Diversity
Erin Fowler*
Introduction
On November 22, 2010, after years of growing concern and
controversy, the Supreme Court of British Columbia opened the
debate on the constitutional validity of the Criminal Code prohibition
against polygamy. The reference case, arising out the failed
prosecution of two prominent members of the Fundamentalist
Mormon sect in Bountiful, British Columbia, has sparked a heated
debate between academics, experts, and legal authorities on whether
the prohibition should be struck down due to constitutional
infringement or upheld because of the belief that polygamy is
associated with gender inequality and the exploitation of women and
children. Despite the large number of government officials,
interveners, and experts weighing in on the issue of polygamy in
Canada, overwhelmingly the focus in the case, and in academic
literature generally, has been on religious and cultural forms of
polygyny: the formal or informal marriage of a man with two or
more wives. However, what is often ignored is that multi-partner
conjugality comes in radically different forms, each with different
personal and social effects.
Polygamy is a general term that subsumes more specific forms and
practices, such as polyandry, polygyny, and polyamory. Within the
Canadian context, available evidence indicates that polygyny is the
predominant form of polygamy practiced.1 In addition to emerging
anecdotal evidence of its presence among some Canadian Muslim
and Aboriginal groups, polygyny is well documented among
*
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Lisa M Kelly, “Bringing International Human Rights Law Home: An Evaluation
of Canada’s Family Law Treatment of Polygamy” (2007) 65 UT Fac L Rev 1 at
para 8 (QL).
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fundamentalist Mormons in British Columbia, and has become the
focal point in the Supreme Court reference case. In Canada, there is
little evidence of polyandry, where one woman has more than one
husband.2 In the past few decades, however, evidence has gathered as
to the growing number of polyamorous relationships that diverge
from the traditional multiple partnerships of polygyny or polyandry.3
Polyamorous arrangements “vary as to the number of people
involved, the sexes of those involved, the sexualities of those
involved, the level of commitment of those involved, and the kinds
of relationships pursued.”4 The variance of these relationships both
in terms of structure and egalitarian founding principles distinguishes
them from the patriarchal norms traditionally associated with
polygyny. In light of this distinction, scholars argue polyamory
merits close attention in re-thinking monogamous paradigms,
particularly in terms of coercive criminal polygamy laws and
marriage law more generally.5 Despite the fact that polygyny
continues to be the predominant form of multiple-partner unions in
Canada, the traditional normative manner of viewing polygamy as
gender-discriminatory and patriarchal ignores minority conceptions
of sexual identity and intimate relationships.
In Canada, non-monogamous patterns of intimacy continue to be
ascribed the status of the “other”—of deviation and pathology—and
in need of explanation, or alternatively are ignored, hidden, avoided
and marginalized. This “mono-normative” perspective tends to
universalize the exclusive, dyadic structure of the couple and
elevates monogamy as the hegemonic norm.6 Marianne Pieper, who
coined the term “mono-normativity”, argues that:
the mono-normative matrix is a complex power relation,
which (re)produces hierarchically arranged patterns of
intimate relationships and devalues, marginalizes,
excludes and ‘others’ those patterns of intimacy which
do not correspond to the normative apparatus of the
2

Ibid at para 9.
Ibid.
4
Maura Strassberg, “The Challenge of Post-Modern Polygamy: Considering
Polyamory” (2003) 31 Cap U L Rev 439 at 440.
5
Kelly, supra note 1 at para 9.
6
Meg Barker & Darren Langridge, eds, Understanding Non-Monogamies (New
York: Routledge, 2010) at 145 [Barker, “Understanding Non-Monogamies”].
3
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monogamous model. Mono-normativity is based on the
taken for granted allegation that monogamy and coupleshaped arranged relationships are the principle of social
relationships per se, an essential foundation of human
existence and the elementary, almost natural pattern of
living together.7
Laws which make it a criminal offence to practice polygamy,8 and
which limit marriage to two individuals, reinforce certain hegemonic
beliefs about sexual identity, intimate relationships, and the ideal
family structure. Rooted in queer theory, this paper seeks to question
the boundaries of monogamy and polygamy in Canada. By
deconstructing monogamy, I will contest the belief that it is a natural,
universal norm, and demonstrate that it is instead a socially
constructed institution rooted in cultural supremacist, classist and
sexist ideals. In rejecting the categorization of intimate relationships,
this paper will highlight that marriage and intimate relationships can
encompass a zone of positive and socially acceptable possibilities.
Re-thinking and deconstructing monogamous paradigms may reveal
polygamy as a legitimate way for individuals to exercise their
autonomy, sexual preference, and expressions of love.
This paper is divided into four parts. In Part I, I discuss how
polygamy is regarded in Canada by reviewing the history and current
treatment of polygamous unions both under criminal law and the law
of marriage. By distinguishing between the various forms of nonmonogamies, I will reveal that it is a fallacy to automatically
conclude that polygamy leads to sufficient social and personal harms
to merit criminal sanction. In Part II, I attempt to deconstruct the
institution of monogamous marriage and reveal its true socially
constructed evolution. Despite marriage’s predominantly Christian
and racist history, I will argue that formal marriage recognition
remains symbolically significant in Canada and that, if the
prohibition against polygamy is struck down, expanding the
definition of marriage to include more than two people would be in
accord with Canada’s recognition of diverse family forms and
equality protections. In Part III, I propose a different way to look at
7

Ibid.
The term “polygamy” will be used throughout the paper to refer all forms of
plural marriage or conjugal unions.
8
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the monogamy versus polygamy debate though the lens of queer
legal theory. Through queer theory, I will question the categorization
of intimate relationships and reveal the difficulties of pursuing
change through the Charter. Finally, in Part IV, I will make
suggestions as to how the law can move towards a more pluralistic
conception of personal relationships.
Part I: Polygamy In Canada
1.

The Current Debate Over the Constitutionality of Section
293 of the Criminal Code

Contrary to common Western assumptions, the majority of societies
worldwide – about 83 percent – practice polygamy.9 In Canada and
the US alone, it is estimated that approximately 30,000 to 100,000
people are involved in some form of plural marriage.10 In recent
decades, concerns over polygamy have grown for a number of
reasons that reflect developments in other countries, as well as some
developments that are more uniquely Canadian. The most publicized
concern is the practice of polygamy by Fundamentalist Mormons in
the area of Bountiful, British Columbia. While this group has been
openly practicing polygamy in Canada for over 50 years, the issue
has received attention only over the past two decades with former
members of the community raising concerns about both the practice
of polygamy and abuse within the community.11 Until recently,
however, uncertainty about the constitutional validity of Canada’s
laws prohibiting polygamy, and concerns about how to enforce the
law have made authorities in British Columbia reluctant to act.12
Finally, after long-standing allegations of abuse and corruption, in
January 2009, Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints13 (FLDS) bishops, Winston Blackmore and James Oler, were
9

Robert Leckey & Kim Brooks, eds, Queer Theory: Law, Culture, Empire (New
York: Routledge, 2010) at 141.
10
Ibid.
11
Canada, Status of Women Canada, Polygamy in Canada: Legal and Social
Implications for Women and Children – A Collection of Policy Research (Ottawa:
Status of Women Canada, 2005) at 3.
12
Ibid at 1.
13
The Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints is one of the
largest Mormon fundamentalist denominations.
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each charged with one count of polygamy.14 Those charges were
subsequently dismissed on procedural grounds.15 Rather than
appealing the decision, the Attorney General of British Columbia
decided to bring a reference case in the Supreme Court of British
Columbia.16 The Court is being asked to determine if section 293 of
the Criminal Code17—the provision prohibiting polygamy—is
consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and
to clarify how it should be interpreted.
By and large, the anti-polygamy argument being brought by both
federal and provincial attorney generals has presented polygamy as a
patriarchal practice with inherent individual and social harms. This
narrative includes stories of child brides, teen pregnancy, and
expelled boys, and it relies heavily on evidence collected from the
FLDS community in Bountiful, BC.18 The pro-polygamy argument,
on the other hand, has relied on the fact that the enactment of the
anti-polygamy law in 1892 was aimed at defending a Christian view
of proper family life and was employed in the state’s cultural
colonization of Aboriginal peoples.19 In constitutional terms, the
amicus curiae has argued that the prohibition breaches the Charter
guarantees of freedom of religion, association, equality (in terms of
both religion and marital status) and liberty.20
In his opening statement before the BC Supreme Court, the amicus
curiae, George Macintosh, argued that section 293 is based on an
assumption that polygamy is,
a practice uniformly associated with harm; essentially,
that it is ‘barbarous’. The law is based entirely on
presumed, stereotypical characteristics, is not
responsive to the actual characteristics of the particular
14

Blackmore v British Columbia, 2009 BCSC 1299, [2010] 4 WWR 546.
Ibid.
16
Reference re: Criminal Code of Canada (B.C.), 2011 BCSC 1588, [2011] BCJ
No 2211.
17
Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 293(1).
18
Reference Re Criminal Code, s 293 (1 November 2010) Vancouver S-097767
(BC SC) (Opening Statement on Breach, Amicus Curiae) [Amicus Curiae].
19
Reference Re Criminal Code, s 293 (1 November 2010) Vancouver S-097767
(BC SC) (Opening Statement on Breach, Canadian Polyamory Advocacy
Association) [CPAA].
20
Amicus Curiae, supra note 18.
15
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polygamous relationships, and has the effect of
demeaning the dignity of practitioners of polygamy.21
Allied with Macintosh on this sentiment is the Canadian Polyamory
Advocacy Association (CPAA)—one of many interveners in the
case. The gist of the CPAA’s argument is that the broad prohibition
in section 293 captures all types of marriage or marriage-like
relationships involving more than two people, encompassing the
egalitarian multi-partner union known as conjugal polyamory.
In its Opening Statement on Breach, the CPAA points out that our
society’s bias towards monogamy is merely the result of social
traditions that are passed on from generation to generation.22 It
should not be mistakenly assumed that the nineteenth century
position on polygamy was about gender equality. Instead, the
racialized and politicized roots of the polygamy doctrine in both the
United States and Canada give pause to assertions that the law is
both valid and important in protecting individual freedoms and
democracy.
2.

History of the Treatment of Polygamy in Canada Under the
Law

Polygamy has been illegal in Canada since 1892. The original
polygamy prohibition was enacted as part of the first Criminal
Code23, with the intent of discouraging immigration by polygamous
American Mormon families, who at that time were being actively
prosecuted by the United States government.24 The law’s politicized
roots are revealed in the wording of the original statute, which
included a specific reference and prohibition on “Mormon”
polygamous marriages, as well as other polygamous relationships.
The target clause was not removed from the Criminal Code until
1954.25 The present provision in the Criminal Code, section 293,
prohibits not only participation in a polygamous marriage ceremony,
21

Ibid.
CPAA, supra note 19.
23
Criminal Code, SC 1892, c 29, ss 278, 706.
24
Nicholas Bala, “Why Canada’s Prohibition of Polygamy is Constitutionally
Valid and Sound Social Policy” (2009) 25 Can J Fam L 165 at para 26 (QL) [Bala,
“Constitutionally Valid”].
25
Criminal Code, SC 1953-54, c 51, s 243.
22
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but also makes it an offence to enter into “any form of polygamy” or
live in “any kind of conjugal union with more than one person at the
same time.”
Since 1892, there have only been a handful of prosecutions under the
Code’s polygamy sections, most of which involved Aboriginal
men.26 One of the most notable of these was R v Bear’s Shin Bone,
the 1899 case of a Blood Indian from the North West Territories,
Bear’s Shin Bone, who was convicted under the polygamy section
for entering into simultaneous conjugal unions with two women.27
Susan G. Drummond asserts that the use of the law to forcefully
restructure Aboriginal families suggests that, in addition to its
racialized and politicized American roots, it was also implemented as
an instrument of colonization.28 Prior to the recent Bountiful
prosecution, the last reported attempt at using this provision was in
1937, when it was held by the Ontario Court of Appeal that a man
who left his wife and was living in an adulterous relationship was not
committing the offence of polygamy.29
Similar to the treatment of polygamy under the criminal law,
Canada’s family law restriction of marriage to two people can also
be traced back to the nineteenth century. The definition of marriage
accepted by the courts until the Marriage Reference30 was adopted
from an English decision in 1866. Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee
involved a potentially polygamous marriage in which an Englishman
had married a Mormon woman in Utah.31 Lord Penzance, striving to
exclude such a marriage from receiving the same treatment as a
traditional monogamous one, stated: “marriage, as understood in
Christendom, may for this purpose be defined as the voluntary union
... of one man and one woman, to the exclusion of all others.”32 This
explicitly Christian definition of marriage prevailed in Canada from
1866 to 2005, wherein the Civil Marriage Act changed the definition
26

Bala, “Constitutionally Valid”, supra note 24 at para 27.
R v Bear’s Shin Bone (1899), 4 Terr LR 173, 3 CCC 329 (NWT CA).
28
Susan G Drummond, “Polygamy’s Inscrutable Criminal Mischief” (2009) 47
Osgoode Hall LJ 317 at para 31 (QL).
29
R v Tolhurst and Wright, [1937] 3 DLR 808, 68 CCC 319 (Ont CA) [Tolhurst].
30
Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004 SCC 79, [2004] 3 SCR 698 [Marriage
Reference].
31
Hyde v Hyde and Woodmansee (1866), LR 1 P & D 130 (Prob & Div).
32
Ibid at 133.
27
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to “the lawful union of two persons to the exclusion of all others,”
while continuing to prohibit plural unions from civil marriages.33
3.

Distinguishing Between the Various Forms of NonMonogamies

In order to fully understand the draconian nature of the criminal
law’s treatment towards polygamy, it is important to distinguish
between the various forms of non-monogamous relationships and to
question their moral and criminal status within Canada. To limit the
distinction in this paper to “monogamy” and “polygamy” would be
to oversimplify the diverse range of both monogamous and nonmonogamous relationships. Indeed, the range of labels and categories
Western societies impose on the variety of intimate relationships
makes one question whether the distinction between monogamy and
non-monogamy is even useful or meaningful.
The traditional conception of monogamy refers to a form of marriage
in which an individual has only one spouse at any one time.
Monogamy may also refer to the more general state of having one
mate at any one time to the exclusion of all others. Despite this
generally accepted ideal, current research within the fields of
sociology and psychology has shown that these so-called
relationships are generally monogamous in name rather than deed,
with non-consensual non-monogamy being a more common mode of
relating.34 Even within truly exclusive relationships, there is a
variation between life-long relationships and serial monogamy. With
our staggering rates of divorce and our culture’s high valuation on
choice and individuality, life-time commitments are increasingly
seen as a thing of the past with serial monogamy—characterized by a
series of long- or short-term, exclusive sexual relationships—taking
its place as the “norm”.
In addition to non-consensual non-monogamy (generally referred to
as adultery or infidelity), there is a range of consensual nonmonogamous relationships: open relationships, swinging, and
33

Civil Marriage Act, SC 2005, c 33, s 2.
Meg Barker & Darren Langridge, “Whatever happened to non-monogamies?
Critical reflections on recent research and theory” (2010) 13 Sexualities 748 at 753
[Barker, “Critical Reflections”].
34
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polyamory being the forms most studied to date.35 Broadly speaking,
polyamory involves having multiple relationships which may be
emotionally close and/or sexual in nature, whereas “swinging”
(spouse-swapping) and open relationships involve couples openly
having sexual (but generally not emotionally close) relationships
with other people—either separately or as a couple.36 Even within
polyamory, there is a diverse range of relationship structures and
networks with varying sexual orientations, genders and numbers
involved.
Due to the broad wording of section 293, conjugal polyamory—
where three or more parties in a polyamorous relationship all live in
the same household—falls squarely within the polygamy prohibition
under the Criminal Code. Despite the argument that this egalitarian,
emotionally grounded relationship structure is considered a criminal
offence, short of constituting “acts of indecency”, other forms of
consensual and non-consensual non-monogamous relationships are
perfectly legal. The Criminal Code does not make adultery an
offence, and as was laid down in R v Tolhurst and Wright, sex with
one partner while being married to another, whether or not
consensual, does not constitute polygamy.37
Further, recent case law has held that swinging practices, short of
causing harm, are not indecent acts for the purpose of the Criminal
Code. In the 1982 case of R v Mason, an Ontario court held that
swinging parties, in a private non-commercial setting, do not
constitute indecent acts.38 Husbands and wives (common law and
civilly married) can freely invite other sexual partners into their
homes for the pleasure of casual sex. In addition to swinging in
private homes, according to the Supreme Court of Canada, swinging
and group sex are also acceptable in bars. In the 2005 case of R v
Labaye, the accused operated a club in Montreal that permitted
couples (both married and not) and single people to meet each other
for group sex.39 Labaye was charged with keeping a common bawdyhouse under section 210(1) of the Criminal Code. In acquitting the
accused, the majority of the Court made it clear that the Crown had
35

Ibid at 750.
Ibid.
37
Tolhurst, supra note 17.
38
R v Mason (1981), 6 WCB 112, 59 CCC (2d) 461 (Ont Prov Ct (Crim Div)).
39
R v Labaye, 2005 SCC 80, [2005] 3 SCR 728 [Labaye].
36

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

102

failed to establish that any harm had been committed. The threshold
to establish harm was set by determining whether the conduct
confronts the public with behaviour that interferes with their
autonomy and liberty, pre-disposes others to anti-social behaviour, or
physically or psychologically harms the people involved in the
conduct.40 The harm also needs to be incompatible with the proper
functioning of society. In the case of swinging, in so far as the
activity was taking place in a private setting, the threshold of harm
was not met.
Clearly, neither the Canadian courts nor Parliament have problems
with adults privately engaging in adultery, swinging or group sex.
Indeed, with the importance Canada places on liberty, autonomy and
diversity, it is no wonder that Canada would be slow to restrict
private sexual activity. Rather, it appears to be the point at which the
relationship with each sexual partner becomes spouse-like that the
criminal law steps in. It is the identification of “conjugal unions” in
section 293 that captures marriage-like polygamous relationships
within the section. While casual sex within or outside of a marriage
is freely permitted, our law takes issue with concurrent multiple
relationships that appear marriage-like in nature. Considering this
seemingly arbitrary approach, one must ask, what is so special about
marriage to justify criminal sanction against these polygamous
unions?
Part II: The Institution of Monogamous Marriage
In Canada, marriage is an exclusive and categorically fixed
institution. If we are to expand the notion of marriage through queer
theory, an important first step is to question and deconstruct this
dominant norm. Therefore, this next section will question the
importance of the institution of marriage itself and ask why it is
limited to two individuals in Western culture.
1.

Why is Marriage Limited to Monogamous Couples?

Political, popular and psychological discourses tend to present
monogamous coupledom as the only natural and/or morally correct
form of human relating. Contrary to the dominant assumption of
40

Ibid.
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monogamous marriage as a natural institution, numerous scholars
have demonstrated the historical and culturally situated nature of
monogamy. The monogamy bias (or mono-normativity) perpetuates
the idea that the maximum number of sexual relationships that is
acceptable for any person to engage in at the same time is one.41
Critiques of this mono-normative view have taken various forms.
Some simply focus on the socially constructed history of monogamy,
whereas others point to monogamy’s religious, political and
racialized roots. In general, as was stated by the CPAA in its opening
statement, “[t]he monogamy bias, like the heterosexual and racial
bias, is the result of social traditions that are passed on from
generation to generation and have nothing but the weight of the past
to support them.”42
First, much literature emphasizing the diversity of relationship forms
counters evolutionary and biological essentialist arguments of
“natural monogamy” by using statistics on the rarity of pair-bonding
amongst animals (only a few dozen out of four thousand mammal
species), and within human cultures.43 George Murdock’s famous
cross-cultural analysis, Ethnographic Atlas, revealed that 195 of 250
societies preferred plural forms of marriage, though monogamy was
universally practiced due to gender ratios and economic barriers.44
Moreover, reducing monogamy to an innate or natural practice can
be viewed as another in a long line of similar arguments, all now
discredited, by which anti-democratic law makers have tried to block
social change. Consider that for over one hundred years homosexual
conduct was criminalized in Canada, and for years after those laws
were repealed homosexuals were denied rights that heterosexuals
enjoyed. A commonly given reason for such discrimination was that
homosexuality is contrary to nature.45
More explicitly, social constructionist authors have written about
recent transformations in Western identities and intimacies, which
have greatly altered the ways in which people understand and
41

Barker, “Understanding Non-Monogamies”, supra note 6.
CPAA, supra note 19 at para 25.
43
Barker, “Critical Reflections”, supra note 34 at 752.
44
Jamie R Wood, “Moving Beyond the Bedrooms of our Nation: Redefining
Canadian Families From the Perspective of Non-Conjugal Caregiving” (2008) 13
Appeal 7 at para 13 (QL).
45
CPAA, supra note 19 at paras 56-60.
42
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experience their relationships.46 The social constructionist approach
to sexuality is grounded in the belief that our identity, desires,
relationships and emotions are shaped by the culture in which we
live.47 As perpetuated through media representations, the dominant
version of relationships available in Western culture is of life-long or
serial monogamy with “the one” perfect partner. Mainstream media
are saturated with depictions of such romantic love relationships:
people finding “Mr/Miss Right” and staying “together forever”. In
contrast, polygamous relationships are represented in the media
through shows such as Big Love48 and the media frenzy surrounding
Bountiful, BC, as patriarchal, gender discriminatory, and “cult-like”.
These representations serve social functions, maintaining monogamy
in a position of hegemonic dominance.49
The ability of our culture to shape and perpetuate the monogamy bias
is by no means a natural social evolution. Rather, many scholars
argue that it is a consequence of calculated state objectives rooted in
cultural supremacist, classist and sexist ideals.50 Sarah Carter, in her
recent book, The Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and
Nation Building in Western Canada to 1915, argues that Canadian
land settlement policies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries constructed an ideal of marriage that was used as a vehicle
for the domestication of Western Canada by white Christian families.
This nuptial model was one characterized as monogamous,
heterosexual, intra-racial, male dominated and self-sufficient.51 Land
policies were designed to marginalize and exclude communities who
did not adhere to this spousal idea. What mattered most was the
peaceful and prosperous settlement of the West, and any distractions
from this (whether from the fluid, indulgent and cavalier nature of

46

Ani Ritchie & Meg Barker, “‘There Aren’t Words for What We Do or How We
Feel So We Have To Make Them Up’: Constructing Polyamorous Languages in a
Culture of Compulsory Monogamy” (2006) 9:5 Sexualities 584 [Ritchie,
“Constructing Polyamorous Languages”].
47
Ibid at 585.
48
Big Love, 2006, Television Show: (New York, NY: HBO, 2006).
49
Ritchie, “Constructing Polyamorous Languages”, supra note 46 at 588.
50
Sarah Carter, The Importance of Being Monogamous: Marriage and Nation
Building in Western Canada to 1915 (Edmonton: University of Alberta Press,
2008).
51
Ibid.

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

105

customary aboriginal marriage or other) were to be muted or
eliminated.52
Like Sarah Carter’s analysis of Canadian settlement policies, other
political critiques of mono-normativity follow from the ways in
which it can be located in a specific cultural and historical moment.
Indeed, compulsory monogamy has been tied to contemporary
consumer capitalism and notions of ownership, patriarchal religion,
race and class, and gender and compulsory heterosexuality.53 Victoria
Robinson sums up the key political arguments in her statement that
monogamy, “privileges the interests of both men and capitalism,
operating as it does through the mechanisms of exclusivity,
possessiveness and jealousy, all filtered through the rose-tinted lens
of romance.”54 Others argue that current forms of monogamy came
into being historically because of the need for women to care for the
current and future workforce without being paid.55 Nancy Cott, in her
history of public regulation of marriage, asserts that marriage has
been a tool of “cultural regulation” and is the vehicle by which the
state transforms the public order into a “gendered order.”56 Moreover,
numerous scholars agree that marriage law in general has been a site
for the production of normative citizenship and a key mechanism by
which Western governments can produce a heterosexual, gendered,
and racialized citizenry.57
The racial and religious hierarchies of white supremacy and
Christian hegemony are thought to have been fundamental to the
processes of distinction that mark polygamy’s social and political
intolerability.58 Margaret Denike argues that,
52

Ibid.
Barker, “Understanding Non-Monogamies”, supra note 6 at 257.
54
Victoria Robinson, “My Baby Just Cares for Me: Feminism, heterosexuality and
non-monogamy” (1997) 6:4 Journal of Gender Studies 143 at 144.
55
M Munson & JP Stelboum, The Lesbian Polyamory Reader: Open
Relationships, Non-Monogamy, and Casual Sex (New York: Haworth Press,
1999).
56
Nancy F Cott, Public Vows: A History of Marriage and the Nation (Cambridge,
Mass: Harvard University Press, 2000).
57
Jaime M Gher, “Polygamy and Same-Sex Marriage – Allies or Adversaries
Within the Same-Sex Marriage Movement” (2008) 14 Wm & Mary J Women & L
559 at 565.
58
Margaret Denike, “The Racialization of White Man’s Polygamy” (2010) 25:4
Hypatia 852 at 857.
53
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the preoccupation with polygamy in the late nineteenth
century was both fuelled and exacerbated by the ‘racial
Anglo-Saxonism’ of the emergent nation in the face of
racial and cultural heterogeneity, at a time of post civilwar anxiety about the naturalness of America’s racial
and political destiny as a white Christian nation.59
She describes how genealogical analyses reveal the deep fears and
profound sensitivities around the origins, allegiances, and
distinctions of blood during this era.60 Moreover, the efforts by the
dominant class to legitimize, institutionalize, and naturalize a
Christian sexual morality of (white) heterosexual monogamy, and to
delegitimize any other familial or intimate relational configuration,
especially when associated with a different religious doctrine, further
stigmatized individuals engaged in polygamous relationships.61
As can be surmised from the discussion above, most critiques of
mono-normativity point to the explicitly Christian foundation of
monogamous marriage. In most ancient societies, rules and laws
about marriage were intertwined with religious texts, beliefs, and
practices.62 For example, the legal prohibitions in the English
common law on marriage to blood relatives and in-laws (rules about
consanguinity and affinity) were based on the Old Testament of the
Bible.63 While the Old Testament accepts polygamy without critical
comment, the New Testament, on the other hand, recognizes the
special nature of marriage and the importance of marital love.64
Although polygamy is not condemned in the New Testament, major
Christian faiths determined that marriage is to be monogamous.65
Indeed, as was stated above, the common law definition of marriage
as the “voluntary union for life of one man and one woman, to the
exclusion of all others” accepted in Canada until 2005, was
59

Ibid at 855.
Ibid at 853.
61
Ibid.
62
Bala, “Constitutionally Valid”, supra note 24 at para 7.
63
Leviticus 18 and 20, as interpreted in Roman Catholic canonical law at the
Council of Trent (1563) and Archbishop Parker's Table in Church of England's
Book of Common Prayer.
64
Bala, “Constitutionally Valid”, supra note 24 at para 9.
65
Ibid at paras 8-9.
60
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unapologetically based on a religious, and explicitly Christian, view
of marriage.66
It would be difficult and erroneous to point to one particular reason
why marriage in Canada is limited to two people. Whatever the
cultural and political reasons were for separating monogamy and
polygamy under the law, it is clear that along the way a dichotomy
was created in which “monogamy” was seen as good (Christian,
gender-equal, law abiding, family oriented) and “polygamy” as bad
(dangerous, promiscuous, non-white, hedonistic, unchristian).
Marriage itself has been viewed by some as simply an archaic
institution used to perpetuate the dominant hegemonic ideals.
However, regardless of marriage’s predominantly Christian and
politically charged past, the next section will explain why formal
marriage recognition remains symbolically significant in Canada and
how the expansion of marriage to include polygamy would be in
accord with Canada’s increasing acceptance of a diverse range of
relationships.
2.

Why is Marriage Important? Why Expand It At All?
“Marriage is one of the great mediators of individuality
and community, revelation and reason, tradition and
modernity. Marriage is at once a harbor of the self and a
harbinger of the community, a symbol of divine love and
a structure of reasoned consent, an enduring ancient
mystery and a constantly modern invention.”67
John Witte Jr.

Leading up to the lengthy campaigns for same-sex marriage, many
may be surprised to learn that many gays and lesbians actually
opposed the fight for same-sex marriage.68 Opponents expressed
concerns over the dangers of assimilation, of losing both a unique
66
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culture and the sense of solidarity and identity that came with
membership in that community.69 While organizations like the
Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Rights in Ontario argued that samesex couples should receive the same legal recognition and incur the
same obligations as heterosexual couples, others argued that samesex relationships are fundamentally different from heterosexual
relationships.70 After years of strategy and progress with other rights,
the LGBT (“Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender”) community
perspective eventually came to be that while not everyone desired
marriage, some did, and the community would rally behind and
support their freedom.71 Laurie Arron, the National Coordinator of
Canadians for Equal Marriage, noted that opponents had, over the
years, stepped up a pre-emptive fight against gay rights and in
particular, gay marriage, which they saw as the ultimate threat.72 The
casting of marriage as a threat by conservative opponents, Arron
argued, drew the LGBT community together, and they came to see
marriage as symbolic of their larger struggle.73 The marriage fight
thus became symbolic of dignity, freedom, equality and full
participation for a diverse coalition of LGBT people.74
Although the fight towards formal polygamous marriage recognition
may still be a ways away, in order to understand the full manner in
which the law in Canada has ostracized polygamous relationships, it
is important to address the significance of marriage within our
culture. In addition to the treatment of these relationships under the
criminal law, denying polygamous relationships the right to enter
into legal marriage only further marginalizes these groups and
perpetuates the mono-normative idea that monogamy and coupleshaped arrangements are the only valid and acceptable relationship
form. Indeed, the language of marriage continues to hold great
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symbolic and institutional meaning in Canada.75 As the same-sex
marriage campaign illustrates, beyond its functional implications in
ascribing immediate benefits and obligations, marriage recognition
plays a significant culturally constitutive role.
During the lengthy legal battle towards same-sex marriage
recognition, several courts commented at numerous times on the
importance of the right to marry. In Halpern v Canada (Attorney
General) the Court of Appeal for Ontario noted:
Marriage is ... one of the most significant forms of
personal relationships. For centuries, marriage has been a
basic element of social organization in societies around
the world. Through the institution of marriage,
individuals can publicly express their love and
commitment to each other. Through this institution,
society publicly recognizes expressions of love and
commitment between individuals, granting them respect
and legitimacy as a couple. This public recognition and
sanction of marital relationships reflect society’s
approbation of the personal hopes, desires and
aspirations that underlie loving, committed conjugal
relationships. This can only enhance an individual’s
sense of self-worth and dignity.76
As the court noted in Halpern, marriage recognition involves much
more than an argument for equal access to “economic benefits.”77
Both inside and outside the courts, many have noted the symbolic
importance that the language of marriage provides. For example,
Evan Wolfson argues that “language defines possibility and place,
and marriage is part of the vocabulary of commitment and family.
We have to use the same language so that everyone else will
understand.”78 This idea of the messaging or expressive function of
law speaks to the idea of law playing a greater role than simply
ordering society and solving disputes.79 For James Boyd White, “law
75
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acts rhetorically in establishing, maintaining, and transforming
community and culture,” something he refers to as “constitutive
rhetoric.”80
If one views the law through the constitutive lens that White urges us
to, giving marriage rights to non-monogamous relationships may
help break the mono-normative hold. With the enactment in 1982 of
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and the inclusion of
same-sex couples in the definition of marriage under the Civil
Marriage Act, Canada is increasingly moving towards greater
recognition of diverse family forms. At one time there was a broad
social and legal consensus about who was a “spouse”, what was
“marriage”, and what was a “family”, but these concepts have
increasingly been subject to social, legal and political challenge.81
The law no longer defines the family exclusively in terms of
heterosexual marriage, but now corresponds more closely to the
functional and pluralistic reality of intimate adult relationships in
Canada. Thus, a future move towards formal recognition of
polygamous marriage would not only help break the monogamy bias
but also would be a natural next step in Canada’s move towards
recognizing diversity and providing equality, autonomy and liberty
for all.
Of course, it may be argued by some that entry into a traditionally
heterosexual, couple-based institution would risk assimilation and
the loss of unique polygamous cultures. However, as was seen in the
LGBT fight for equal rights, the freedom to choose has the symbolic
power to elevate the status of polygamy in society as a legitimate,
socially acceptable form of expressing one’s love. Further, as will be
discussed below, if marriage law in Canada is able to move away
from a categorical, exclusion based approach and more towards a
pluralistic conception of marriage, where entry would no longer be
limited to particular identity categories, individuals would be able to
choose for themselves what form their marriage will take and how
their needs for sexual and emotional intimacy, material support,
reproduction and childrearing are to be met.
80

James Boyd White, "Law as Rhetoric, Rhetoric as Law: The Arts of Cultural and
Communal Life" (1985) 52 U Chicago L Rev 684 at 684.
81
Nicholas Bala, “Controversy over Couples in Canada: The Evolution of
Marriage and Other Adult Interdependent Relationships” (2003) 29 Queen’s LJ 41
at para 1 (QL).

Vol. 21

Dalhousie Journal of Legal Studies

111

Part III: A Queer Critique on the Polygamy Debate
1.

A Queer Conception of Intimate Relationships

The academic discourse known as queer theory emerged during the
1980s and 1990s as a critique of both feminist and gay and lesbian
theories at that time.82 In response to the constellation of issues
around sexuality and discrimination, gay and lesbian politics tended
to naturalize binary sexual identities and adopted a formal equality
model that sought to equate the moral value and political status of
homosexuality and heterosexuality.83 It is in this context that queer
theorists developed their skepticism of the identity-based nature of
feminist and gay legal theories. Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick applied this
criticism in terms of the hetero/homo divide. She developed her
queer theory based on the rejection of the constrained binary of
heterosexual/homosexual and sought to understand sexuality as more
fluid. She recognized a multiplicity of sexual possibilities rather than
a hierarchy in which the heterosexual presides over the
homosexual.84 Like Sedgwick, many queer theorists blur the rigid
line typically drawn between heterosexual and homosexual and seek
to radically pluralize sexed and gendered practices.85
The exact parameters of queer theory are difficult to determine.
Central to the project though is the contestation of boundaries and
categories, not only of sexual identity, but more widely to include the
boundaries of normalcy itself.86 If it has a core, queer theory is about
resisting categorization: it has been described as a “zone of
possibilities in which the embodiment of the subject might be
experienced otherwise.”87 Moreover, queer theorists constantly seek
to reflect upon the contingency and ambiguity of all sexual
categories. Rather than constituting an identity category itself, queer
82
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theory highlights the contingency of all boundaries of social practice
and identity, including its own.88
It is in this context that this paper seeks to question the boundaries
and identity categories of intimate relationships—monogamy and
polygamy in particular. This section develops a queer analytic for the
study of personal relationships in the twenty-first century, which is
grounded in an appreciation of the variety of ways in which people
live their lives outside of the mono-norm. The mono-normative
perspective, developed through political, racial, and religious ideals
and perpetuated through cultural representations, has valorized the
relatively narrow, categorical approach to marriage and intimate
relationships. As was articulated above, monogamy as a hegemonic
norm is based on the assumption that couple-shaped relationships are
the only valid, morally acceptable form of conjugal union. From this
perspective, non-monogamies continue to be demonized, avoided,
and denied the legal rights available to monogamous couples.
If we are able to step away from the idea that monogamy is the only
valid way of relating, we can begin to appreciate the plurality of
sexual practices and identities. In viewing the monogamy/polygamy
divide through a queer lens, we must be cautious to not describe our
goal as the attainment of formal equality. By ascribing polygamy the
status of a sexual minority, we would merely be perpetuating the idea
that relationships are hierarchical, with monogamy retaining its
status as the ideal. This approach would continue to situate
monogamy as the corner stone of marriage, while other relationships
would merely be provided the opportunity to achieve the same status.
Instead of limiting intimate relationships to monogamy versus
polygamy, by looking at relationships and sexual practices along a
continuum of variation, we might be able to develop a discourse
wherein all types of intimacies are respected and treated as equal.
Gayle Rubin in her article, “Thinking Sex: Notes for a Radical
Theory of the Politics of Sexuality”, commented on how most
systems of thought about sex attempt to conform sexuality to a single
standard.89 She argues:
88
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variation is a fundamental property of all life, from the simplest
biological organisms to the most complex human social
formations. Yet sexuality is supposed to conform to a single
standard. One of the most tenacious ideas about sex is that
there is one best way to do it, and that everyone should do it
that way.90
It would be quite objectionable to insist that everyone be
heterosexual, married, or conventional. So why do we believe that all
relationships should be monogamous?
In collapsing the boundaries of sexuality, exposing relationships as
fluid, and in pluralizing sexed and gendered practices, the queering
of the monogamy/polygamy divide can encompass a greater range of
constituents and open up a legitimate range of sexual, gendered, and
relational possibilities. The idea that sexual and relational categories
are stable and mutually exclusive has been identified as a specifically
modern Western phenomenon.91 Exposing the constructedness of the
monogamy/polygamy boundary will hopefully provide opportunities
for further resistance of mono-normativity.
2.

The Queer Resistance of Marriage

Despite the arguments laid out above—namely, that marriage is an
important institution that, if expanded, can provide a vehicle in
which non-monogamous forms of intimate relationships can achieve
respect and recognition—some queer scholars argue that, by seeking
marriage rights, sexual minorities misguidedly try to legitimatize
their sexualities through an oppressively monogamous, proprietary,
shame-based institution that forbids constructions of freer sexuality.92
Michael Warner, in his book Trouble with Normal, argues, “even
though people think that marriage gives them validation, legitimacy,
and recognition, they somehow think that it does so without
invalidating, delegitimating, or stigmatizing other relations, needs,
and desires.”93 Indeed, if we are to deconstruct the
90
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monogamy/polygamy divide through the lens of queer theory and
argue for the expansion of marriage, it is important to address the
inherent normativity of marriage itself.
A conception of activism as enlarging the life options of individuals
in all relationship forms has manifest appeal. However, this way of
thinking says nothing about whether pursuing legal marriage is a
good political strategy, about the ethical questions of what marrying
does, about state regulation, or about the normativity of marriage.
Warner sums up the queer arguments against the pursuit of marriage
by describing it as a social system of both permission and restriction:
Marriage sanctifies some couples at the expense of
others. It is selective legitimacy. This is a necessary
implication of the institution ... To a couple that gets
married, marriage just looks ennobling ... Stand outside it
for a second and you see the implication: if you don’t
have it, you and your relations are less worthy. Without
this corollary effect, marriage would not be able to
endow anybody’s life with significance. The ennobling
and the demeaning go together. Marriage does one only
by virtue of the other. Marriage, in short, discriminates.94
In addition to the exclusionary effect of marriage, in the modern era,
marriage has become the central legitimating institution by which the
state regulates and permeates people’s most intimate lives.95 The
consequences of marriage are tied to privileges and prohibitions,
incentives and disincentives, as well as the state regulation of
sexuality. According to queer theory, each of these should be
challenged, not celebrated, as a condition of the right to marry.96
According to Warner, as long as people marry, the state will continue
to regulate the sexual lives of those who do not marry:
[The state] will continue to refuse to recognize our intimate
relations—including cohabiting partnerships—as having the
same rights or validity as a married couple. It will criminalize
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our consensual sex. It will stipulate at what age and in what
kind of space we can have sex.97
In sum, as long as there is marriage, the state will continue to accord
legitimacy to some kinds of consensual sex but not to others, or to
confer respectability on some people’s sexuality but not on others. It
is within this normalizing effect that queer theorists have rejected the
strategy of pursuing legal marriage.
Despite these arguments against the pursuit of legal marriage, it is
important to keep in mind the symbolic effect of legal marriage and
the status conferred informally by marriage. It must be made clear
that in arguing for the retention of marriage, this paper is not
intending to make the case for marriage. Indeed, marriage’s
discriminatory and exclusionary effects cannot be ignored. Instead,
this paper is simply calling for the questioning of the conception and
boundaries of marriage. In expanding marriage to include a variety
of relationship forms, it could be seen as one step towards a larger
goal, in which the legitimacy of state regulation over people’s
intimate lives and the categorization of relationships could be
confronted and challenged rather than simply ignored.
3.

The Categorical Foundation of the Common Law

Although examining the polygamy/monogamy divide through queer
theory has the potential to empower the oppressed and disrupt the
hegemonic hold over monogamy, it is important to address salient
arguments against the pursuit of change through this discourse.
Namely, it is important to consider that protections and benefits can
only be achieved through categorization and that categorical thought
is the foundation of the common law method of analysis, which
makes it impossible to conceive of a legal process to address
relationships without assigning categories. Although broader
arguments have been made against the legalization of polygamy,
including its associated individual and social harms, this section will
only deal with arguments that could be made against the liberation of
relationships through a queer analysis.
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First, some may adopt the view provided by Tim Edwards in his
critique of queer theory and politics and argue that the celebration of
diversity would only lead to individualism and fragmentation.98
Edwards argues that marginalized groups should stick together rather
than focusing on differences.99 Although the success of minority
movements in advancing equality cannot be ignored, in a plural
country, where individual identities cannot be reduced to notions of
only gender or sexuality, limiting political action to categorical
groups has the effect of excluding individuals who either cannot fit
their identity into a particular group or who consider their identity to
include complex or varying dimensions. Limiting a political
movement to polyamory, for example, while excluding other forms
of non-monogamies would be similar to limiting the queer
movement to homosexuals, while excluding others who might more
accurately identify themselves as bisexual, transgendered, or
transsexual. Not only would this exclude a diversity of sexual or
gender identities from social, political, and legal recognition, but
would propagate the notion that some sexual identities are superior to
others. Therefore, in speaking about non-monogamies, it is
imperative that we resist the categorization or “normalization” of
intimate relationships when moving towards political action and
legal change.
Further, some might wonder how it would be possible to bring such
language and politics to bear in legal discourse, when legal discourse
is built upon categories. Some queer theorists, such as Carl Stychin,
suggest that legal strategies might ultimately demand some sort of
essentialism or use of identity categories, given that categorical
thought is the foundation of the common law method of analysis.100
Strategic essentialism, coined by Cayatri Chakravorty Spivak, is the
move away from essentialism as a negative practice and towards
essentialism as a means to resist essentialism.101 It is the choice to
98
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develop an essentialized community, discrete minority or general
category, such as “woman” or “queer,” for the purpose of advancing
specific political goals. Postmodern feminists and queer theorists
turn to strategic essentialism as a means to empower previously
subordinated groups through self-definition, as opposed to being
defined by those who would oppose them.102 The deconstructive and
yet politically effective nature of this strategy is derived from the
acknowledgement that the essential attributes of this group are
themselves socially constructed as opposed to inherent or innate.103
Although this political strategy recognizes the socially constructed
nature of identity categories, by utilizing strategic essentialism, one
misses the critical opportunity to destabilize the totalized, fixed, and
immutable understandings of sex, gender and sexuality, as well as
their relationships to one another. While strategic essentialism has
been a useful tool in the achievement of basic human rights
protections in Canadian law, we must begin to embrace the
opportunities for creative discursive interventions that resist the
normalizing thrust of categorization.
Unfortunately, the common strategy among non-monogamous
groups has been to disassociate and distance themselves from each
other as a means to counter perceived assumptions that they are all
the same.104 For example, many who identify as being polyamorous
are quick to draw a line between polyamory and more casual sexual
relationships—such as swinging—as a mean of situating emotionally
based relationships as superior to other relationships based solely on
sex.105 However, the move to essentialize polyamory as a relationship
structure based on love and not sex, merely assimilates polyamory
into model mono-normative values where notions of “love” are
central to relationships. As Christian Klesse argues, a “love- and
intimacy-centered discourse of polyamory can be presented as being
superior to other forms of non-monogamy that emphasize more
strongly the pursuit of sexual pleasure.”106 Such hierarchies are in
danger of reinforcing mono-normative relational ideologies and
102
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limiting the more sex radical politics of non-monogamy that some
critics have championed.107 Instead of using discrete and exclusive
categories to resist discrimination, a deconstructive legal strategy
that resists the framing of relationships as essentialized categories
may help to bolster queer theory’s broader insurgent project: one
aimed at freeing sexuality from categorical identity constraints and
from law’s regulative project.108
4.

A Queer Critique on Litigating for Change Under the
Charter

In Canada, the categorical approach to anti-discrimination law
depends upon binaries that necessarily privilege one identity
resulting in subordination of the other.109 It is within this concept that
polygamous activists must be cautious in arguing for change under
the Charter. A challenge to section 293 of the Criminal Code (as we
have seen in Reference re: Criminal Code of Canada (B.C.)) and the
civil definition of marriage may be brought under the Charter’s
section 15 equality guarantee, the section 7 liberty guarantee or the
section 2(a) right to freedom of religion. It may seem desirable to
approach the subordination of non-monogamies through section 15
of the Charter, as it is the predominant legal tool in which to address
state discrimination. However, because the section 15 analysis turns
on a categorical approach to discrimination, it becomes difficult to
align queer theory with a section 15 Charter challenge.
As was developed by the Supreme Court of Canada, when asserting a
section 15 Charter challenge, the claimant must draw an analogy
between the enumerated ground and the unenumerated ground based
on historical or social disadvantage due to discriminatory treatment,
which has been suffered by individuals as a consequence of
membership in the group.110 This focus on categories of
discrimination has led to much criticism. A general concern raised is
that categories can become naturalized and essentialized and as a
result the list of enumerated categories may appear historically and
socially fixed.111 As Nitya Iyer has argued, this approach to anti107
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discrimination law fails to acknowledge that social identities are
geographically and historically contingent.112 Moreover, the existence
of a series of categories masks the “invisible background norm”.113
Each category becomes a distinction from the norm, for which
protection is appropriate while the norm remains in place,
permanently fixed, immutable, and “undeconstructed”.114
The essentialist/immutability model and the categorical approach
that it accompanies are highly problematic from the perspective of
queer theory. The categorical approach constrains the challenge
posed by queer activists to the coherence and stability of identity
categories and disguises the role of relations of oppression in their
construction and maintenance.115 Thus, arguing that either the
Criminal Code prohibition or the definition of marriage in the Civil
Marriage Act discriminates against polygamists under section 15
requires polygamy to be assigned a fixed identity, distinct from other
relationship forms. Monogamy, in turn, would remain the
undeconstructed norm. As a result, this approach would do nothing
to question and deconstruct sexual, relational and familial identity
categories.
Further, in litigating for change under section 15 of the Charter, a
claimant must fit his/her experience into a ground of
discrimination-—a process that may be difficult for many claimants
to do.116 Douglas Kropp argues that the Canadian courts’ use of the
“enumerated or analogous grounds” approach, with its reliance on
neat, tidy and rigidly demarcated categories to define the rightsbearing subject, ensures that those persons who are unable to
categorize or caricaturize themselves according to one of the
enumerated categories find themselves “falling through the cracks”
of Canadian equality and anti-discrimination law.117 This approach
raises two concerns: (1) it demands that differences in terms of
disadvantage and social location between individuals who share
112
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membership in the same group are overlooked in the course of
articulating the shared disadvantage;118 and (2) the focus on
immutability demands that categories—both enumerated and
analogous—be based on “personal characteristics” that are stable,
fixed and not a matter of choice. Queer theory, in part, is about a
logic of identity that is far more complex than just gender or
sexuality, but instead recognizes that dimensions such as race,
ethnicity, and religion all combine to constitute a person’s identity.
Therefore, to reduce a discrimination claim to sexual orientation or
family status—both grounds that polygamists might rely on under
section 15—would overlook important aspects of a person’s identity
as well as other factors that may have contributed to the
discrimination faced by polygamists.
Moreover, there is a concern that individuals who experience
discrimination based on their involvement in a polygamous union
may be unable to describe that experience as being based on an
enumerated or analogous ground. Although parallels have been
drawn between polygamy and same-sex marriage, in that they both
involve challenges to the traditional definition of marriage, sexual
orientation has been recognized as a prohibited ground of
discrimination because it is an inherent aspect of a person’s
identity.119 In contrast, many view polygamy as a particular type of
chosen behaviour. Although the CPAA asserts that “conjugal
polyamory is not just an outward practice but an inward component
of the self of those who engage in it,”120 the argument that it may not
be an immutable characteristic could preclude a successful claim. In
general, the test of immutability contradicts queer theory by
underscoring a view of so-called personal characteristics as essential,
neutral, and historically continuous rather than as historically
specific, culturally changeable, and the outcome of a “particular
pattern of social relations” based upon oppression.121
Although section 15 of the Charter relies to a great extent on the
categorization of discrimination, it could be argued that pursuing
change to the legal status of polygamy under sections 7 or 2(a) of the
Charter aligns itself with queer theory. Due to the fact that this paper
118
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wishes to break the stereotype that polygamy is only a religious
practice (found predominantly in the Mormon and Muslim faiths), I
will not address a section 2(a) freedom of religion, claim. However,
in retaining a queer perspective of sexuality and relationships, a
challenge under section 7 of the Charter may be a progressive means
of moving forward. In being denied the right to live in polygamous
relationships without criminal prosecution and the right to formally
enter marriage with more than one person, polygamists might be able
to argue that their right to “liberty and security of the person” has
been breached. Moreover, as was argued by the amicus curiae in
Reference re: Criminal Code of Canada (B.C.), by banning
polygamy, section 293 of the Criminal Code deprives polygamists of
the freedom to make fundamentally and inherently personal choices
with respect to their intimate relationships, and so implicates basic
choices going to the core of what it means to enjoy individual dignity
and independence.122 Both the threat of imprisonment and the
curtailment of a fundamentally personal choice constitute
deprivations of liberty for the purposes of section 7.123 In contrast to a
section 15 challenge, a challenge to anti-polygamy laws under
section 7 would retain the idea that sexuality and relationships are
fluid and can encompass a plurality of forms. In denying a person the
right to chose for themselves how their personal relationships can
best meet their needs, both the criminal law and marriage law have
denied these individuals their right to liberty as is guaranteed under
the Charter.
However, like section 15, there are also problems associated with
litigating for change under section 7. Some have argued that the view
of marriage as simply a personal choice is wholly inadequate to
evaluate the strategy of pursuing legal marriage because it neglects
marriage’s legal and cultural consequences on others, such as those
who resist marriage or those who are drawn to it for a mix of
reasoning not of their own making.124 Indeed, presenting marriage as
an unconstrained individual option requires us to forget it is a social
system of both permission and restriction.125 In arguing for change, it
must be borne in mind that marriage is not simply a choice that can
be exercised privately without costs to others. In providing
122
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legitimacy to a range of relationship structures, attention must be
called to the ways in which relationships are constructed in society
and the repercussions of state regulation. Therefore, whatever legal
strategy is pursued, any argument for plural marriage requires a
concern about how that strategy defines relationships and the effect
of that strategy upon the pursuit of a plurality of sexed and gendered
practices.
Part IV: Going Forward: Pluralizing Marital and Familial
Forms
The discussion thus far has attempted to broaden the current
polygamy debate that is ongoing in the British Columbia courts. I
have argued, first, that the ideal of monogamous marriage is a
socially and politically constructed institution, perpetuated in
Western societies through cultural stereotypes and dominant
discourse. Second, I have shown that by deconstructing and
questioning the boundaries and identity categories of intimate
relationships, we can begin to appreciate a plurality of sexual
practices and identities and empower those who do not fit into the
mono-norm.
How, then, should the law respond to this queer perspective on
intimate relationships? The first obvious step would be to remove the
criminal law’s regulating power over intimate relationships. The
utility of section 293 of the Criminal Code, which prohibits the entry
into “any form of polygamy” or live in “any kind of conjugal union
with more than one person at the same time”, is thought to protect
women and children from evils such as child abuse, domestic
violence, and forced or underage marriage—all of which are already
prohibited under other laws in Canada.126 As a law solely based on
racists and political motivations, section 293 of the Criminal Code
merely perpetuates the mono-normative perspective of monogamy as
an essential foundation of personal relationships and the natural
pattern of living together. From this perspective, polygamy, as well
as other relationships which do not represent this pattern, are
demonized, pathologized, marginalized, and subject to the criminal
law’s punitive power. Only through the decriminalization of
polygamy will Canada begin to recognize the value in non126
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monogamous relationships. Further, beyond section 293, we must
begin to consider other status-discriminatory regulations for
sexuality. Although this paper has focused on polygamy, we must
question the criminal law’s regulatory hold over all forms of sexual
practices and intimacies. Although some legal restrictions are likely
legitimate due to their aims of protecting individuals from harm,
other provisions, like the prohibition against polygamy, may simply
be a means of perpetuating hegemonic norms.
Secondly, people engaging in non-monogamous relationships are
often unable to claim the relationship rights gained by monogamous
couples. It is therefore suggested that we begin to question Canada’s
conception of what marriage is and who is legally able to participate
in marital unions. From the viewpoint of liberal theory, the state
should remain neutral with respect to competing conceptions of what
marriage is and of how individuals’ needs for sex and emotional
intimacy, material support in daily life, reproduction and childrearing
are to be met.127 The state fails to be neutral when it chooses one
particular form of relationship to support.128 We must question the
desirability of defining a single form of state marriage. With the
multiplicity of care-giving and familial structures in Canada, the
notion that relationship rights and marriage should be limited to
dyadic, conjugal unions is an archaic assumption that is out of touch
with the reality of life in Canada. Thus, Canada would do better to
move toward a more pluralistic conception of personal relationships,
and it might do so in one of two ways. As suggested by Cheshire
Calhoun, “we might adopt a fully contractual approach to emotional,
sexual, childrearing, and adult support relationships. In that case, the
state would simply enforce the terms of the contracts agreed upon by
the contracting parties.”129 Alternatively, we can retain the institution
of marriage, but expand it to include a plurality of marriage or
relational options rather than a single state-sanctioned form of
marriage. Due to the symbolic importance of marriage in Canada for
both the dominant majority and those who identify more with
subjugated groups, arguably the retention and expansion of marriage
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would be the preferred option. While this approach may be
questioned due to the de-legitimating and invalidating nature of
marriage, an expansion of marriage could be seen as a step towards
the larger goal of breaking down the privileging, regulatory manner
in which Canada views intimate relationships.
Conclusion
In the first post-Charter case to deal with the issue of same-sex
marriage, Layland v Ontario, Justice Greer, in dissent, stated: “It is a
basic theory in our society that the state will respect choices made by
individuals and the state will avoid subordinating these choices to
any one conception.”130 Despite the fact that the Supreme Court of
Canada ultimately adopted this position with respect to same-sex
marriage, Canada continues to assert the belief that marriage can
only take place between two people to the exclusion of all others.
Not only does our law fail to recognize plural marriage; it actually
penalizes individuals who enter into any kind of conjugal union with
more than one person at the same time. In taking this stance, the law
has over-generalized and stereotyped an intimate relationship
structure as being inherently gender discriminatory and harmful to
women and children. Instead of accepting the diverse reality of
intimate relationships, our legal system has situated monogamy as
the only valid way of relating.
The Supreme Court of British Columbia is finally faced with the
important opportunity to address this discrimination.131 Instead of
focusing on the polygyny practiced in Bountiful, BC, in giving
respect to all forms of plural unions, the Court must acknowledge
that polygamy can be practiced in a way that promotes equality,
dignity and love. For too long the monogamy bias has been accepted
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in Western society without question. For the most part, we have
ignored the manner in which monogamous marriage privileges,
excludes, and provides the vehicle in which the state can regulate
intimate relationships. The deconstruction and questioning of this
social institution will hopefully provide opportunities for resistance
against mono-normativity and stimulate a discourse wherein intimate
relationships can be viewed as fluid instead of categorical and
exclusive.
Marriage continues to be an important institution in Canada and
abroad. Despite the fact that it has been used as a tool to privilege the
dominant class and exclude people that might be considered as
“other,” entry into it carries with it the symbolic power to transform
community and culture. Through the queering of the
monogamy/polygamy divide, an important opportunity emerges in
which we can collapse the boundaries of sexuality, expose
relationships as fluid, and pluralize sexed and gendered practices.
Therefore, decriminalizing polygamy and expanding marriage to
include a plurality of relationship forms would be an important step
in breaking the monogamy bias. Although the idea of marriage itself
and the state’s continued regulatory hold over intimate relationships
are essentially antithetical to queer theory, a deconstructive legal
strategy which aims to break down the categorical, exclusionary
nature of marriage may help to bolster queer theory’s broader
insurgent project to free sexuality from categorical identity
constraints and open up a legitimate range of sexual, gendered and
relational possibilities.

